In the last sentence of Barton Bernstein's book review, he referred to Edward Teller as the father of the hydrogen bomb.
Teller was the speaker at a small meeting I attended in Berkeley, California, in the mid-1970s. After his talk, 1 asked a question and addressed him as the father of the H-bomb. Teller immediately interrupted, saying, "I am not the father of the H-bomb. I We should ponder why Teller so energetically refused to be called the father of the H-bomb, and so jealously and unkindly sought to deny Ulam's contribution. In his denial. Teller could seem modest, accept the acknowledgment of scientific "fatherhood," playfully quibble about the term, and still avoid giving Ulam credit. My interpretation is speculative, of course, but it may make sense of an otherwise puzzling matter.
Teller's behavior on this subject should remind us of Oppenheimer, who often claimed not to want to be known as the father of the A-bomb. But after Hiroshima, Oppenheimer was also frequently proud of his major role in the A-bomb's creation.
Teller and Oppenheimer, two men who became fierce enemies, shared much in common, though their .separate, virtually warring camps of admirers seldom acknowledge that. Von Neumann, whether or not he clearly saw the similarities, was flexible enough thathecould maintain alliances with both men.
Barton J. Bernstein

Stauford Univtrsiti/ Stanford, California
A different view on US-India nuclear pact
The item "US-India Nuclear Pact Gets Mixed Reaction" (PlfYSICS TODAY, Febaiary 2007, page 24) makes for amusing reading. I am dismayed at the one-sided and unbalanced coverage. I strongly disagree with the contention of Matthew Bunn from the Belter Center for Science and Intemational Affairs at Harvard University' that the US stands to gain "between not very much and nothing" from this pact. That India has opened 14 of its civilian nuclear reactors to Intemational Atomic Energy Agency oversight is surely a step in the right direction; before the deal the reactors were all off bounds. Mohamed El Baradei, the IAEA's director general, welcomed the pact enthusiastically. Surely, if the leader of the United Nations body whose mission is to prevent global nuclear proliferation endorses the agreement, it can't really be the death knell of nonproliferation. ElBaradei speaks with much credibility, which the writer of the article blissfully ignored, instead giving free rein to obscure think tankers.
Michael Krepon's good guys-bad guys argument essentially echoes the chorus of the nonproliferation pundits who rule Ihe numerous moribund think tanks of Washington, DC, and the Democratic party. Where is the comparison between India, a responsible nonproliferating democracy whose nuclear weapons are under civilian (not military) oversight, and Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea? Having nuclear weapons and yet not proliferafing weapons or the associated technology is not "bad behavior" on the part of India. Unfortunately, "bad guys" such as Pakistanthanks to nuclear scientist Abdul Q. Khan-have exported nuclear weapons development teclinology and rocket design to North Korea and po.ssibly Iran. It's a no-brainer, then, that the Bush administration has categorically refused a similar nuclear deal with Pakistan.
Most important, the article utterly ignores the geostrategic and geopolitical ground realities in both St^uth Asia and East Asia. India's strategic attackpreparedness planning is concemed with China, not Pakistan. Current InLetters and opinions ore encouroged and should be sent to Letters, PHYSICS TODAY, American Center for Physics, One Physics Ellipse, College Park, MD 20740-3842 or by e-mail to ptletters@aip.org (using your surnome as "Subject"). Pieose include your affiliation, mailing address, ond daytime phone number We reserve tfie right to edit submissions.
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